AbstractI seek to approach the theme by raising the same methodological question which I raised in regards to the first lecture. Why do I start with epistemic injustice rather than justice? The answer again is the same, since one is at the receiving end of epistemic injustice, one is bound to conceptually confront it on priority. Second, what is an epistemic injustice? I shall argue, it is an epistemic condition which keeps the knowledge producer or the knower on intellectual probation deploying various discursive devices. Third, what are these conditions that tend to produce the experience of epistemic injustice? I shall try and provide some explanatory account, by arguing that it is social binaries or the dichotomy between mind and body that produce injustice when such binaries get reinscribed in the epistemic practices of those who have arrogated to themselves the legislative power to decide what is relevant and what is irrelevant knowledge.